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DISCOVERY OF WITNESS IDENTITY UNDER
PRELIMINARY PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULE 16
INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the Judicial Conference of the United States promulgated
the first major revision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.'
Chief among the changes made by these revisions was the broadened
right of discovery accorded an accused under federal indictment or
prosecution. This, however, was but a begrudging concession to the
advocates of broad criminal discovery, for it granted the trial court
almost unlimited discretion when passing upon defendants' motions for
discovery. Consequently, the burden of materiality and reasonableness
remained difficult hurdles in the path of the accused, and in numerous
problem areas the trial courts were left either to force fit the accused's
request into the general language of the rule or to deny the request with
little or no comment.3 Nevertheless, there was general agreement that
the promulgation of the 1966 version of Rule 16 would allow a workable
yet equitable system, providing discovery for the accused while safe-
guarding the national security and the security of federal police files.
4
Discovery of the names, addresses and criminal records of prospective
government witnesses is of paramount importance in the preparation
of an adequate defense. However, notwithstanding the view expressed
by C. Allen Wright,5 the courts have almost universally denied such
1. Proposed Amendments to Riles of Criminal Procedure for the United States Dis-
trict Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966). The rules were first enacted under the authority of
18 U.S.C. § 687 (1940), which authorized the Supreme Court to develop rules of plead-
ing, practice and procedure in criminal cases in the federal district courts.
2. The 1946 discovery rule was exclusionary in nature. Aside from its discretionary
language, the rule only allowed the accused to inspect' and copy certain designated
books, papers, documents or tangible objects which had been taken from him or seized
by process or otherwise taken from third parties. The accused had to show that the
discovery was material to the preparation of a defense and the request was reasonable.
The 1946 rule contemplated no right of discovery for the prosecution. See 8 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRAcnicE § 16.02[2], at 14-16 (1970).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419 (S.D. Ind. 1967); United
States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Crisona, 271
F. Supp. 150, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
4. See Address by C. Wright, Proceedings of the Twenty-ninth Annual Judicial Con-
ference, Third Judicial Circuit of the United States, Sept. 8, 1966, in 42 F.R.D. 437, 567
(1966). Mr. Wright described discovery under Rule 16(a) as "a matter of right, subject
only to the power of the court to issue protective orders in proper cases.. . "
5. Mr. Wright envisioned the discovery of witnesses' identity under 1966 Rule 16(b).
See 42 F.R.D. at 569. However, his enthusiasm had waned by 1969, perhaps because of
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requests as beyond the scope of Rule 16.6 By the time the Advisory
Committee (to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States) began work on the 1970
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts, it was obvious that this area of dis-
covery needed affirmative treatment.7 Hence the proposed amendments
contain a completely revised Rule 16. The revised rule will allow nearly
unlimited discovery, on motion, of the names, addresses and conviction
records of the witnesses the government intends to call.8
SCOPE
This note will examine witness lists as a subject of criminal discovery.
Primary consideration will be given the preliminary draft of proposed
Federal Criminal Rule 16 (a) (1) (VI), (b) (1) (3) and related subsec-
tions. These subsections represent the major change in the proposed
Rule 16 from earlier revisions and the first affirmative inclusion of wit-
the reception which the requests for such discovery had had in the courts. See C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 254, at 516 (1969).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387
US. 907 (1967); United States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419, 427 (S.D. Ind. 1967);
United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 473 (N.D. Ili. 1967); United States v. Marge-
son, 261 F. Supp. 628, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1966). There is provision made for the discovery
of witnesses' names in capital cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1964). From the earliest
common law the right has never been thought to extend to non-capital cases. For a
thorough discussion of section 3432 see Orfield, Lists of Witnesses and Jurors in Fed-
eral Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 527 (1968).
7. Accord, ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
§ 2.1, at 52 (1969); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1961); Wright supra note 5; Comment, Toward Effective Criminal
Discovery: A Proposed Revision of Federal Rule 16, 15 VILL. L. REv. 655 (1970).
8. Preliminary Proposed Amended Rule 16(a) (1) (VI), in PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES Dis-
TRICT CoURS, 48 F.R.D. 547, 589-90 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 PROPOSED AMEND-
mENTs], provides:
Upon motion of the defendant the court may order the attorney for the
government to furnish to the defendant a written list of the names and
addresses of all government witnesses which the attorney for the government
intends to call at the trial together with any record of prior felony con-
victions of any such witness which is within the knowledge of the attorney
for the government. Names and addresses of government witnesses shall not
be subject to disclosure if the attorney for the government certifies that to
do so may subject the witness or others to physical or substantial economic
harm or coercion. Where a motion for the discovery of the names and
addresses of witnesses has been made by a defendant, the government may
move the court to perpetuate the testimony of such witnesses in a hearing
before the court or a United States magistrate in which hearing the defend-
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ness lists discovery in the Federal Criminal Rules.' Further, this note
will examine procedures of the various states relating to the discovery
of witness lists in order to determine whether the shortcomings of exist-
ing state practices have been effectively avoided in the draft of the
proposed federal rule. Finally, this aspect of the proposed Federal
Criminal Rule 16 will be evaluated in light of the rapidly developing
trend toward a more liberal criminal discovery, bearing in mind the
necessity of protecting the interests of the parties involved. 0
DISCOVERY OF THE WITNESS UNDER PAST AND PRESENT
FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULE 16
In 1948, Congress enacted a statute which furnished the defendant
in a capital case under federal jurisdiction with a list of witnesses' names
and addresses at least three days prior to trial." This was a reenacted
portion of the Crimes Act of 1790 which had extended to those under
indictment for treason. 12  These statutes notwithstanding, it is clear
that no right to a witness list existed in noncapital cases at common law. 1
ant shall have the right of cross-examination. A record of the witness'
testimony shall be made and shall be admissible at trial as part of the gov-
ernment's case in chief in the event the witness has become unavailable
without the fault of the government or if the witness has changed his testi-
mony.
Analogous to 16(a) (1) (VI) is the prosecution's right of discovery. Preliminary Pro-
posed Amended Rule 16(b) (1) (I), in 1970 PRoPosw AMaNDMENTs, 48 F.R.D. 591-92:
"Upon motion of the government, the court shall order the defendant to furnish the
government a list of the names and addresses of the witnesses he intends to call at the
trial."
9. See 1970 PROPOSED AMENDZMENTs, 48 F.RD. at 603-10.
10. For a general discussion of criminal discovery see Louisell, supra note 7; Reznick,
The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEo. L. J. 1276 (1966); Discovery
in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481 (1968). For particular areas bearing on criminal dis-
covery, see Comment, Rights of a Criminal Defendant to Inspect Papers in the Posses-
sion of the State, 16 BAYLOR L. Rnv. 51 (1964); Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases,
31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 320 (1965); Note, Right of the Criminal Defendant to the Com-
pelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 953 (1967); Note, Pretrial Criminal
Discovery: The Need for Expansion, 35 U. CN. L. REv. 195 (1966); Annot., Discovery
and Inspection of Prosecution Evidence Under Federal Rule 16 of Criminal Procedure,
5 A.L.R.3d 819 (1966); Annot., Statements and Reports of Government Witnesses Pro-
ducible in Federal Criminal Case under Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 3500), 5 A.,.R.3d 763
(1966); Annor., Right of Accused in State Courts to Inspection or Disclosure of Evi-
dence in Possession of Prosecution, 5 A.L.R.3d 8 (1966).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1948).
12. See Orfield, supra note 6.
13. United States v. Butler, 25 F. Cas. 213, 216 (No. 14.700) (C.CD.S.C. 1877); 6
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1850, at 391 (3d ed. 1940).
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Thus, prior to the 1966 amendments to the Federal Criminal Rules, pre-
trial discovery by the defendant, in general, was either very limited
or non-existent. The dominant thinking was reflected by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Garrison, "Under our criminal procedure the
accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to
the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense." 14
This thinking, based upon the accused's right against self-incrimination
and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" criteria for conviction, failed to
consider the disadvantaged position of the individual defendant in pre-
paring a defense against an adversary with practically unlimited investi-
gatory machinery and resources. Nevertheless, pre-trial discovery for
the accused was grounded on the assumption that the defendant was in
the advantageous position. 15
The 1966 amended rule contemplated an expanded discovery for the
defendant and a reciprocal right of discovery in the prosecution.' 6
The overall thrust of the new rule was consistent with the desire to
structure criminal procedure and proceedings with a greater emphasis
on the quest for truth.'
The rule, envisioning a complete disclosure of those facts necessary
to the preparation of a defense,' 8 set forth the general requirements of
reasonableness and materiality as a standard for ruling on motions for
discovery. Accordingly, at least one commentator immediately urged
that defendants be allowed discovery of the names and addresses of all
persons having knowledge of pertinent facts. Indeed, the discovery
of the names and addresses has been considered to be a prerequisite to
14. 291 F. 646, 649 (1923).
15. The Advisory Committee indicated, however, that it appreciated the govern-
ment's initial advantage:
While the government normally has resources adequate to secure the infor-
mation necessary for trial, there are some situations in which mutual dis-
closure would appear necessary to prevent the defendant from obtaining an
unfair advantage....
39 F.R.D. 69, 177 (1966).
The mutual disclosure in the committee note is not directed to witness lists, but a
new approach is evident.
16. See AMENDMENTS TO RuLEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, in 39 F.R.D. 69, 175-76 (1965)
(Advisory Committee's note to Rule 16).
17. Brennen, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963
WASH. U. L. Q. 279. See generally, Louisell, supra note 7.
18. This basic requirement of disclosure was laid out as a principle by Chief Justice
Marshall speaking in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692) (C.C.D. Va.
1807). Since then, the principle has acted as a spring-board for the broadening of
defense discovery regardless of the stage at which the request is made.
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the ability to show reasonableness and materiality under 16(b)." This
interpretation would have been consistent with the requirement that
the government must relinquish to the defendant information favorable
to the defendant's case. °
In practice, the 1966 amendment has been much more narrowly con-
strued than the commentators had envisioned. The problem seems to re-
volve around the broad discretion with which the court is invested to
grant or deny motions for discovery under the general criteria set up,
in the rule. Discretion allowed the trial judges to go beyond the spirit
of the rules and close off myriad requests for discovery merely because
the requests were not within the judicially construed ambit of the rule or
because the requests appeared to the court to constitute an unauthorized
rummaging through government files. 21 A noted commentator, speak-
ing with regard to criminal discovery and judicial discretion, said:
How can the trial judge be rational, and at the same time, sensi-
ble? And how can the appellate courts-or legislatures, for that
matter-establish guides flexible enough to take account of realities,
without committing the matter to the trial judges' unfettered "dis-
cretion"-ittie more than a euphemistic slogan for leaving the
trial bench wholly at large and therefore, potentially, wholly arbi-
trary?22
Under the present Rule 16, requests for lists of prosecution witnesses
appear to be chief among the targets of judicial discretion. The almost
universal application of judicial discretion to deny discovery of wit-
ness lists has been buttressed by the adamant refusal of appellate courts to
19. Address by C. Wright, supra note 4, at 569. Mr. Wright's view is buttressed by
the restriction on discovery by the defendant of the statements of prospective govern-
ment witnesses until they have testified in open court. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1964). It is apparent that this restriction creates a "gap" with regard to the discovery
of exculpatory information. Since every person interviewed in the investigation of a
crime is a prospective witness for the United States, at least prior to trial, the defendant
is denied access to any leads he might have gleaned from an examination of the state-
ments. If the person interviewed is not called, his statement becomes forever an internal
government document not open to discovery. To allow the defendant the names and
addresses of the prospective witness would allow access to potential exculpatory infor-
mation without compromising the content of government files. See generally, Reznick,
supra note 10.
20. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), holding that it is a violation of due
process for the prosecution to withhold evidence favorable to the accused where the
evidence is material to guilt or punishment.
21. See note 6 supra.
22. Louisell, supra note 7, at 56.
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overturn the decisions of trial courts unless the defendant could show
a clear abuse of the trial judge's discretion.23 This reluctance is based
upon the practical consideration that the trial judge is in the best posi-
tion to make a subjective evaluation based upon the criteria of ma-
teriality and reasonableness.
The cases are legion which have rejected the defendant's request for
discovery of a witness list.24 Without explanation, the trial courts de-
clare that witness lists do not meet the test of materiality or reasonable-
ness. Thus, one court, while generally subscribing to a liberal discovery
theory, tenaciously clings to the proposition that the prosecution should
not be forced to relinquish witness lists prior to trial.25 This same court
has said that information is discoverable by the defendant "'which the
prosecution expects to utilize in proving the charges in this indict-
ment.' "26 In the next breath, however, the court has denied a motion
for discovery of a "certain category of witnesses" as being "clearly
improper." 27 Will not the prosecution utilize its witnesses in proving
the charges in the indictment? The analysis of the court in United
States v. Tanner, however, is typical of judicial treatment of the present
discovery Rule 16.
DISCOVERY OF WITNESS LISTS, STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
Before discussing the nuances of witness list discovery under the
proposed federal rule, it is profitable to investigate the approaches to
this area of discovery in state criminal procedures. The comments to
proposed Rule 16 cite twenty-two state statutes as representative of
the state approach to criminal witness discovery.28 However, the
statutes of several other states also contain provisions for such discovery.
Some of these statutes contain interesting procedural variations. This
examination of the state efforts in discovery of criminal witness lists
discloses both a definite trend and certain critical deficiencies.
23. See Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1968). The court in Hemp-
hill further held that a guide for determining abuse would be whether or not the lower
court's action prejudiced the case against the defendant. See also Gevinson v. United
States, 358 F.2d 761 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 823 (1966).
24. See United States v. Burgio, 279 F. Supp. 843, 847 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); United States
v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 473 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United States v. Birrell, 276 F. Supp.
798, 825 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); United States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419, 427 (S.D. Ind.
1967).
25. United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 471 (N.D. Il. 1967).
26. Id. at 470.
27. Id. at 473.
28. 1970 PRoposED AMFNDMaNTs, 48 F.R.D. at 603-04.
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State statutes allowing discovery of the names of prosecution wit-
nesses can be grouped into three general categories: (1) those statutes
requiring endorsement of the names-not always addresses-of those wit-
nesses appearing before the grand jury from which the indictment or
presentation issued;29 (2) those statutes requiring a list of those witnesses
known to the prosecuting attorney;30 and (3) those statutes requiring
a list of witnesses the prosecution intends to call to prove its case.31
Statutes Requiring Indorsement of Names of Witnesses
Before Grand Jury
Seventeen of the twenty-two statutes cited as representative by the
Rules Committee in its comment to proposed Rule 16 are of this type.3 2
Twelve states, in addition to those cited by the Rules Committee, have
similar statutes. 3 Most trace their origins to nineteenth century proce-
29. See, e.g., ALAsKA R. CRIm. P. 7(c); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1004 (1947); MAss. GEN.
LAwS ANN. ch. 277, § 9 (1959).
30. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-931 (1964); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.980 (Supp.
1969); S.D. Coap. LAWS ANN. § 23-20-4 (1967). South Dakota law differs with regard
to informations, which require an indorsement of names known to the prosecution at
the time of filing, and indictments, which require indorsement of the names of witnesses
examined before the grand jury. See SD. CoAvn,. LAWS ANN. § 23-31-5 (1967). The
different approach with regard to indictments and informations is representative of
states which provide for certain crimes which can be prosecuted under each and the sepa-
rate procedure that can grow up in this regard.
31. See, e.g., ARIz. R. Ciua. P. 153; MD. R. Cam. P. 728(a) (3).
32. ALAsKA R. CRIM. P. 7(c); ARiz. R. Ciua. P. 153; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1004 (1964);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 995(a) (West 1970); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-3-6, 39-4-2 (1963);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 906.29 (1944), superseded by FLA. R. ClM. P. 1.220(d); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 19-1404 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-903 (1956); IowA CODE ANN. § 772.3 (1950);
Ky. R. Cm. P. 6.08; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.08 (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 545.070
(1953); NEv. REv. STAT. § 173.045 (1967); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 384 (1969); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 132.580 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1708 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-3
(1953).
33. GA. CODE ANN. 27-1403 (1953); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1317 (1965); MD.
R. CmvL P. 717; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 277, § 9 (1959); N. M. STAT. ANN. §
41-6-47 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-138 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-11-57 (1960);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, R. 207 (1964); S.D. ComstP. LAws ANN. § 23-31-5 (1967); TEx. CODE
Cmat. P. ANN. art. 20.20 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-157 (Supp. 1960); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 52-2-8 (1966). Maine has an interesting variation on this type of statute. While
the statute requires a list of wimesses appearing before the grand jury to be filed with
the clerk of court, there is a specific prohibition against releasing this information until
trial is had or the case otherwise disposed of. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1317 (1965).
On the other hand, ME. R. CGma. P. 16(a), provides for inspection of written or re-
corded statements, testimony of witnesses, including transcripts of testimony of wimesses
before the grand jury. Rule 16 became effective in 1969, and while not specifically
repealing section 1317 it would seem to take precedence except in the case of a misde-
meanor charge being heard before the district court or magistrate. Thus, it appears
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dural reforms. The objective of these statutes is merely to avoid sur-
prise and, in some instances, to provide limited assistance to the ac-
cused in preparation of a defense. In the final analysis, mere discovery
of witnesses who appeared before the grand jury can hardly be said
to fulfill the accused's right to know his accusers.
Often, this type of statute is construed as only directory in nature.',
As thus construed, the statute has little efficacy because there is no sanc-
don for failure to comply with its terms. In Johnson v. State, 5 error
was assigned because the trial court permitted prosecution witnesses
not listed on the indictment to testify. The Texas court, upholding the
murder conviction, pointed out that the statute calling for indorsement
of grand jury witnesses was directory only and, therefore, could not
be construed as confining the prosecution to the witnesses listed on the
indictment. The damaging testimony in this case came from unlisted
witnesses whose identities were unknown to the defendant prior to trial.
Nothing in the opinion indicates that these particular unlisted witnesses
had testified before the grand jury, but because of the directory nature
of the statute, an unlisted grand jury witness's testimony would have
been admissible. The final determination of the admissibility in this
situation was left entirely within the discretion of the trial court.3 6
Furthermore, in states which have statutes requiring indorsement of
grand jury witnesses, often it has become common prosecution practice
to justify the issuance of an indictment with different witnesses than
those utilized to prove the case at trial.37 Thus even the state statutes re-
quiring the indorsement of grand jury witnesses which are mandatory
in nature are often rendered nugatory by the admission of the testimony
of unlisted witnesses.38
Legislative efforts to liberalize the discovery of witness lists through
the use of grand jury indorsement statutes have been subjected to vary-
that discovery of the names of witnesses can be had by resort to Rule 16(a) while a
list, as such, would not be available.
34. E.g., Tx. CODE CrM. P. art 20.20 (1966).
35. 205 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Cr. App. 1947).
36. See Mullins v. State, 425 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Cr. App. 1968); Pruett v. State,
114 Tex. Crim. 44, 24 S.W.2d 41, 42 (1929).
37. See, e.g., Legislation, Florida's Proposed Rules of Criminal Discovery-A New
Chapter in Criminal Procedure, 19 U. FLA. L. R. 68, 91 (1966).
38. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 628.08 (1947). But see State v. Poelaert 200 Minn.
30, 273 N.W. 641 (1937), holding that it is not necessary for the state to indorse the
names of witnesses other than those appearing before the grand jury and thereby open-
ing the door to the unlisted additional witness; State v. Waddell, 187 Minn. 191, 245 N.W.
140 (1942), holding, in derogation of the prima facie legislative intent of the statute,
that failure to indorse all grand jury witnesses was not fatal to the indictment. See also
[Vol. 12:603
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ing interpretations by the state courts. The Oregon statute is typical
of this process." The Oregon Supreme Court, interpreting the statute
in State v. McDonald,4" has announced that only those witnesses the
grand jury believes can give competent evidence, and whose evidence
the prosecution expects to use at trial, need be indorsed on the indict-
ment. This construction conceivably could defeat the legislative intent
to insure that the defendant knows by whom he is accused. Further, if
the prosecution expects to use at trial only some of the witnesses appear-
ing before the grand jury, the accused can be effectively precluded
from pursuing leads to exculpatory evidence which might be available
from undisclosed witnesses.4 '
In states having grand jury indorsement statutes, failure by the prose-
cution to comply with the terms of the statutes has little effect upon
the criminal proceeding. Some statutes require the defendant to request
that the court compel the state to indorse the names on the indictment
while granting no continuance unless the request is made at the earliest
opportunity and only if justice so demands.42 Other statutes penalize
the state for failure to comply with the statute by foreclosing the possi-
bility of a continuance when an unindorsed state witness is absent on
the day of trial.43 The most effective method of enforcing the require-
ments of a grand jury indorsement statute44 has been adopted by Cali-
fornia. In that state a second statute provides that when there is a
failure to indorse all grand jury witnesses on the indictment, the trial
court "shall order them to be so inserted or indorsed. . . ., 4
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-3 (1953). The Utah statute is mandatory, but see State v.
Redmond, 19 Utah 2d 272, 430 P.2d 901 (1967) which allowed an unlisted witness to
be called where the defendant made no claim that the district attorney failed to list
preliminary hearing witnesses nor requested the court for a list of additional witnesses.
39. ORE. REv. STAT. § 132.580 (1959).
40. 231 Ore. 24, 361 P.2d 1001, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903 (1961).
41. See Reznick supra note 10, at 1286-87. Mr. Reznick makes this same point with
regard to federal witness lists and statements affected by the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3500 (1964). See also Katz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: The Concept of Mu-
tuality and the Need for Reform, 5 Cium. L. BuLL. 441, 454 (1969).
42. See 6 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-6-47 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-11-57 (1960);
MD. R. CRiM. P. 717. Maryland also has an independent discovery rule which allows the
accused on motion, after demonstrating materiality and reasonableness of request, to ob-
tain a list of names and addresses of witnesses the prosecution intends to call to prove
its case. MD. R. CuM. P. 728(a) (3).
43. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-903 (1956); for an uncharacteristically broad application
of judicial discretion in construing the limits of this type of statute see Bernard v. State,
248 Ind. 689, -, 230 N.E.2d 536, 540 (1967).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 943 (West 1970).
45. Id. § 995A (emphasis added). For a judicial construction of this statute see People
v. Carella, 191 Cal. App. 2d 115, 12 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1961).
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It is clear that one of the legitimate goals of progressive criminal
procedure, avoidance of surprise, cannot be attained by a statute that:
(1) is directory; (2) admits of several and varied constructions; and
(3) provides inadequate and discretionary sanctions for noncompliance
by the prosecution.
Statutes Requiring Indorsement of Witnesses Known
to Prosecuting Attorney
Four of the states cited in the comments to proposed Rule 16 have
adopted statutes requiring the indorsement of all witnesses known to the
prosecuting attorney on the indictment.46 In addition, one other state
has a similar provision requiring such indorsements on informations
Again, the purpose of this type statute is to avoid surprise and to aid
the accused in the preparation of a defense.4" These statutes place a
greater burden upon the prosecution than do the statutes requiring in-
dorsement of only the grand jury witnesses. There is no opportunity,
if the statute is strictly construed, to avoid listing a known prosecution
witness by keeping him entirely out of the case until trial.
Enforcement of this type of statute ranges from discretionary power
subject to reversal for abuse to strict compliance with exceptions.49
The sanctions invoked to insure compliance with the statutes in this
category are varied. Kansas denies the prosecution a continuance if an
unlisted witness is absent from trial.50 South Dakota, on the other hand,
provides that the indictment or information will be set aside on defend-
ant's motion, if the state has not complied with the indorsement statutes.6 '
46. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-802, -931 (1964). MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 767.40 (1968); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-1503 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-1602 (1964).
47. S.D. COMp. LAws ANN. § 23-20-4 (1967).
48. See People v. McIntosh, 6 Mich. App. 62, 148 N.W.2d 220 (1967); Dolen v. State,
148 Neb. 317, 27 N.W.2d 264 (1947).
49. Compare State v. Robertson, 203 Kan. 647, 455 P.2d 570 (1969) (where the state
could endorse additional witnesses within the discretion of the courts) with State v.
Pappenga, 76 S.D. 37, 83 N.W.2d 518, 520 (1957) (where the defendant had to allege
surprise along with a motion for a continuance upon the endorsement of an additional
witness, and absent such procedure no prejudice would be presumed), and People v.
McIntosh, 6 Mich. App. 62, 148 N.W.2d 220 (1967) (where the right to indorsement
is said to be substantive), and People v. Dickinson, 2 Mich. App. 646, 141 N.W.2d 360
(1966) (where failure to indorse a res gestae witness, with exceptions, is prejudicial
error).
50. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-931 (1964).
51. S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 23-36-1 (1967). This statute is modified in the case of
rebuttal witnesses who may be indorsed after the state rests. State v. Weinandt, - S.D.
-, 171 N.W.2d 73 (1969). The allowance made for indorsement of rebuttal witnesses
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Michigan presents one of the most interesting statutes because it rep-
resents the most comprehensive approach in its judicial enforcement.
The statute was drafted for use in prosecutions by information and, aside
from prescribing that all witnesses known to the state must be in-
dorsed, the statute also provides, "Names of additional witnesses may
be indorsed before or during the trial by leave of the court and upon
such conditions as the court shall determine." 52 Because the statute
provides that all witnesses knowan to the prosecution must be indorsed,
in the first instance, meaningful discovery of the names of witnesses
depends in large measure upon the good faith and charity of the prose-
cution. Later, if the defense happens to discover the existence of an
unidentified witness, or the prosecution seeks to introduce an addi-
tional witness, both sides are at the mercy of judicial discretion. This
discretion determines, inter alia, the right to use the witness, the time
for disclosure, and the possibility of a continuance to meet the unex-
pected witness's testimony. Overall, however, the Michigan judiciary
seems to have exercised discretion in the interest of discovery and,
therefore, in an atypical manner.
As has been pointed out, in Michigan the right to the witness's iden-
tity has been construed as a substantive right. 3 Where, however, the
unindorsed witness is not a res gestae witness, e.g., a witness whose
testimony goes to identity, he need not be indorsed. 4 There is also
authority which indicates that rebuttal witnesses must be indorsed under
penalty of reversal, even though their names are known.55 Thus, the
Michigan procedure provides a relatively useful tool for the avoidance
of surprise and the preparation of a defense.
In the final analysis, this type of statute comes closer to open dis-
covery than the grand jury statute. It must be pointed out, however,
that, as construed by most states, even these statutes are inadequate as
after trial has commenced is common to most states regardless of the type of statute
they have. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 230 Md. 113, 186 A.2d 461 (1962); State v.
Washington, 383 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1964).
52. Micr. Comp. LAWS A-N. § 767.40 (1968).
53. People v. McIntosh, 6 Mich. App. 62, 148 N.W.2d 220 (1967).
54. People v. Kern, 6 Mich. App. 406, 149 N.W.2d 216 (1967). This case also held
that where the prosecutor indorses the name of other than a res gestae witness, he must
produce him just as he must produce a res gestae witness. The prosecutor may escape the
duty of production so long as he demonstrates due diligence in an effort to secure the
witness's presence at trial.
55. See People v. Rose, 268 Mich. 529, 256 N.W. 536 (1934). This case was cited
with approval in People v. Sacharczyk, 16 Mich. App. 710, 168 N.W.2d 639 (1969),
which held it reversable error to introduce, in rebuttal, the testimony of two res gestae
witnesses without first indorsing their names.
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discovery devices. In securing a full application of the right conferred,.
too much is left to judicial discretion and prosecutorial good faith. On
the other hand, unlike the grand jury indorsement statute, these statutes
under the proper circumstances do grant the accused the right to
the identity of at least some of the prosecution's material witnesses; at
best, full disclosure of all of the witnesses for the state would be man-
dated.
Statutes Requiring List of Witnesses 'which
Prosecution Intends to Use at Trial
Indorsement statutes involving the list of witnesses which the prose-
cution intends to use at trial come closest to the spirit of the proposed
amended Federal Rule 16(a) (1) (VI). Two of the state statutes cited
by the advisory committee in their comment to proposed amended Rule7
16, those of Arizona and Illinois, are of this type,"G while four other states
have enacted similar discovery provisions. 7
Arizona and North Dakota take a similar approach, requiring by
statute the indorsement of witnesses in regard to an appearance before
the grand jury, and compelling by rule of court the indorsement of the
names of witnesses to be called by the prosecution. No penalty for a
failure by the state to indorse is prescribed. The statutes provide, how-
ever, that on motion by the defendant, the court shall direct that the-
names be indorsed. The only sanction mentioned in the statutes is
directed against the defendant, denying a continuance when the state
calls an unlisted witness if the defense's request for the continuance is
not timely and necessary to insure justice.
The purpose of the Arizona statute is to enable the accused to better
prepare a defense' 8 The failure to indorse the name of a witness will
not of itself disqualify him,"9 and the prosecution is under no affirmative
duty to call all listed witnesses."°
Maryland's rule 728(a) (3) is another variation of this type of stat-
56. Aiaz. R. CRIM. P. 153; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-9 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
57. N.J. REv. RuLEs 3:13-3(c-d); MD. R. CRIM. P. 728(a) (3); N.D. CENr. CODE
29-11-57 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE § 10.37.030 (1961).
58. State v. King, 66 Ariz. 42, 182 P.2d 915 (1947).
59. State v. Thorp, 70 Ariz. 80, 216 P.2d 415 (1950). North Dakota's statute, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 29-11-57 (1960), has been similarly construed. State v. Hopperstad, 69
N.D. 65, 283 N.W. 785 (1939).
60. State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 446, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 932 (1958); State
v. Lowell, 97 Ariz. 269, 399 P.2d 674 (1965).
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ute. ' This procedural rule is designed to aid the defense in the prepara-
tion of its case and to avoid surprise.62
The Washington statute provides reciprocal discovery of witnesses
intended to be used at trial.63 However, either party may add any addi-
tional witnesses, as the court may permit, until the day of trial. The
purposes of this statute are to enable the defense to prepare for trial
and to safeguard the state against surprise. 4 Unfortunately, the statute's
provisions are not mandatory. Failure to comply must result in great
injury to the defendant or an abuse of discretion by the trial court in
order to justify reversal."'
This third type of statute appears to be of great benefit to the
criminally accused defendant. Generally, however, one shortcoming
is the lack of a corresponding discovery right for the state. The few
states having provisions for reciprocal discovery, with the exception of
Washington, grant a discovery to the accused different in ldnd and
effect from that made available to the prosecution. There is a great deal
of difference between allowing the prosecution to discover the wit-
nesses the defense intends to call and granting the defense access to the
witnesses known to the prosecution. The state is able to count on a
61. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. § 114-9(e) (1964), which is similar to Maryland's statute.
The right is secured on motion of the defendant, but there is no requirement of reason-
ableness or materiality. The court has statutorily granted discretion to allow unlisted
witnesses to testify where the prosecution shows that it did not know of them nor
would diligence have disclosed them prior to trial.
62. Brunson v. State, 9 Md. App. 1, 261 A.2d 794 (1970). There is no sanction
against the state for failure to include a name in the witness list. Bieber v. State, 8 Md.
App. 522, 261 A.2d 202 (1970).
63. Florida has a similar, albeit hybrid, rule. FLA. R. Cur. P. 1.220 (e). The Florida
statute is also reciprocal, but the reciprocity is far from equal. This rule can be used
by an accused in addition to or as an alternative to a motion by the defendant for
endorsement of the names and addresses of witnesses upon which the indictment or
information is based. Id. 1.220(d), incorporating FLA. STAT. ANNur. § 906.29 (1944). The
reciprocal process is initiated by the defendant who offers to the prosecution a list of
the witnesses he intends to rely upon at trial. The prosecution must then reciprocate
with a list of witnesses known to the state.
New Jersey on the other hand, provides that on motion by the defendant, and in the
absence of good cause to the contrary, the state will disclose the names and addresses of
persons the state knows to have information and indicate which of those persons the
state intends to call. If the court grants discovery to the defendant, then it may con-
dition its order by allowing the state to discover the names and addresses of persons
known to the accused and whom he intends to call. N.J. REv. RuLEs 3:13-3 (c-d). The
concept of reciprocity presents a constitutional question with regard to the right
against self-incrimination. The question will be discussed in considering Preliminary
Proposed Rule 16(a) (1) (VI) infra.
64. State v. White, 74 Wash.2d 392, 444 P.2d 661 (1968).
65. State v. Jones, 70 Wash.2d 591, 424 P.2d 665 (1967).
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defense that is somewhat defined. The defense, however, must either
guess which witnesses will be utilized or rely upon a prosecutorial
gratuity to indicate which people will appear as witnesses in the cause.
There is a trend in modern criminal procedure toward a corresponding
discovery right for the prosecution and the defense.68 Nevertheless, it is
submitted that without equality both as to kind and effect of discovery
for both parties, the value of the discovery right will remain limited.
The positive effect of these statutes, like their grand jury indorsement
and prosecutorial knowledge counterparts, is further minimized by
undefined discretion and undefined sanctions for failure to comply. The
statutory purposes are invariably said to be the avoidance of surprise and
to aid in the preparation of a defense. These purposes, however, often
are defeated by allowing the trial judge to entertain motions for the
addition of witnesses. And, conceivably, that same judge could then
deny a motion for a continuance, which would have enabled the de-
fense to meet the testimony of the new witnesses, because, in his judg-
ment, the request was not timely or failed to meet the abstract criteria
of "furthering the interest of justice."
Finally, if we are to give force and effect to the trend toward pre-
trial disclosure of facts in an effort to get at truth, if we are to make
the disclosure of opposition witnesses an integral part of the goal of
openness, we must develop rules that minimize variables and give posi-
tive criteria in weighing the efficacy of this type of discovery in a
given case. These among other considerations, taken together, go a
long way toward achieving the desired effect, to wit: the creation of
a criminal proceeding that is designed not to produce convictions for
convictions' sake but to produce justice in light of all relevant facts.
DIscoVERY OF WITNESSES UNDER PROPOSED
FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULE 16
A cursory reading of the preliminary draft of the proposed amend-
ments demonstrates the broad departure which the Advisory Commit-
tee has taken from the underlying discovery theory of the present
Rule 16. The committee, at least with regard to witness lists, has relied
heavily on the trend established in the states. The state statutes, how-
ever, have failed to produce the consistent discovery of witnesses at the
pre-trial stage. The purpose of the proposed amended Rule 16 is the
achievement of a broader right of discovery for both prosecution and
66. See, e.g., Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cit. 1966); Brennen,
supra note 17.
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defense. The committee has also expressed the view that broader dis-
covery for the defense is dependent upon granting a broader right of
discovery to the prosecution. 7
Discovery of Government Witnesses
Proposed amended Rule 16 (a) (1) (VI) provides that the court may,
upon motion, order the government to disclose to the defendant a list
of the names and addresses of all witnesses that the government intends
to call at the trial. Further, the government must include any record
of prior felony convictions of witnesses which is within the knowledge
of the attorney for the government.6 8
Under the present rule, judges consistently have exercised their dis-
cretion to stifle disclosure of information to the accused. 9 Similarly,
state statutory purposes often have been frustrated by allowing un-
fettered discretion to rest in the trial court. However, the proposed
rule does not require a showing of materiality, reasonableness, or need
when making the motion for discovery under 16(a) (1) (VI) 7° While
these criteria are abstract at best, they give trial courts some frame of
reference for considering the efficacy of a particular motion for dis-
covery. This unqualified discretion in the court, without any criteria
for its exercise, could leave the court, in the words of Louisell,
.. . wholly at large and therefore, potentially, wholly arbitrary."71
It is submitted that the elimination of discretionary language in the
rule would promote a willingness on the part of the courts to grant
the discovery of witnesses' identities and would go a long way toward
inculcating this type of discovery in our federal criminal procedure.
This is plausible because the dangers to witnesses from a bad faith use
of the discovered information is minimized by the ability of the court to
deny discovery when the prosecution certifies that discovery in a par-
ticular instance could subject the witness to "substantial physical or eco-
nomic harm or coercion." 72
Initially, one other problem arises with regard to the latitude of Rule
67. 1970 PROPOSED A MaNxENmrs, 40 F.R.D. at 595-96.
68. Id. at 589.
69. See, e.g., Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1968).
70. Contra, FED. R. GRIM. P. 16 (b).
71. Louisell, supra note 7, at 56.
72. 1970 PROPOSED A E'DmNrsrrs, 48 F.RD. at 589-90. Further protection against a
bad faith defendant can be had by resort to the protective order section of the rule
hereinafter discussed. The bad faith defendant is also inhibited by the government's
right of discovery which will be, in each instance, equal if not reciprocal.
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16. As with the states that provide for the discovery of witnesses the
prosecution intends to call, there can be a gap created, because some
witnesses the prosecution may not choose to call could provide valuable
leads to exculpatory information. The problem is compounded in the
federal courts where the movant must contend with the Jencks Act
which protects a witness's statements from discovery until the witness
has testified in open court.73 Oftentimes, certain grand jury witnesses
are not relied upon to prove the case in chief. Under the present con-
struction of the preliminary proposed rule these witnesses could go
undiscovered, absent the charity of the prosecutor in disclosing the
unused witnesses' identity, because the new rule in no way vitiates the
effect of the Jencks Act on discovery of the statements of unused gov-
ernment witnesses. And while in some instances the testimony of a
witness before the grand jury might be discoverable, the defendant
must sustain the heavy burden of demonstrating a particularized need
out-weighing the policy of secrecy.74
By the same token, should discovery of grand jury testimony be
granted, reading the responses to particular questions would not always
be as valuable as a conversation with the individual. In this way, some
information, comprehendable only to the accused or his counsel, might
come to light and, when pursued, might lead to important facts bearing
on the guilt of the accused. This one exclusion from the rule is illus-
trative of the need for modification in order to achieve complete and
therefore meaningful discovery of the witnesses for the government.
The rule includes as discoverable the felony convictions of witnesses
which are within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney. This type
of discovery has heretofore been within the discretion of the court. 7 ,
One commentator has pointed out that, unless some alternate means is
devised to bring false replies to questions on cross examination with
regard to prior convictions to the attention of the court, then this type
of discovery is essential. 6 If the rule is given full effect, the wording
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). See Address by C. Wright, supra note 4, at 569.
74. United States v. Wolfson, 294 F. Supp. 267 (D. Del. 1968); United States v. Tan-
ner, 279 F. Supp. 457 (N. D. Ill. 1967).
75. See United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Ill. 1967). For a case de-
nying the right to discover a witness's conviction record along with discovery of gov-
ernment witnesses under the present Rule 16, see United States v. Westmoreland, 41
F.R.D. 419 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
76. Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 Duic L. J.
477, 510. See also Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 47,
87-88 (1964); Reznick, supra note 10, at 1285. For a state statute granting discovery of
conviction records of state witnesses, see N. J. Rav. R. CRIM. P. 3:13-3(c).
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should be adequate to insure the discovery of the conviction records of
all the witnesses the government intends to call. This is because, in all
likelihood, the conviction record will be a part of the information con-
cerning the prospective witness which the prosecution will want to
keep close at hand.
Discovery of Defense Witnesses
The Advisory Committee, in promulgating the proposed Rule 16,
was convinced that the discovery available to the prosecution must
correspond to that of the defense, and therefore, the committee included
a right to discover the names and addresses of the witnesses the defense
intended to call.77 This has been the chief problem in the state statutes
calling for a reciprocal discovery right to be given to the prosecution.
For on the whole, the right has been an unequal one. For instance, in
Florida the defense must offer a list of witnesses it intends to call, while
the prosecution is only required to divulge the names of the witnesses
known to it at the time of filing.78 This problem would not be con-
fronted under the proposed rule.
The constitutionality of any provision which grants discovery to
the prosecution is questionable in light of the accused's privilege against
self-incrimination 7 9 and the fact that there is no federal case in point
with regard to self-incrimination and the discovery of the names and
addresses of defense witnesses. In order to overcome the problem, the
concept of reciprocal discovery was developed. This theory provides
that when the defendant makes application for discovery he thereby
waives his right to invoke the self-incrimination privilege to defeat
corresponding prosecutorial discovery. 0 This necessitates waiving the
privilege in order to gain discovery. In this way the defendant is com-
pelled to allow discovery. This is apparently done without considera-
77. 1970 PRoposmr A ENDNENTs, R. 16(b) (1) (in), 48 F.R.D. at 592. The rule appears
in an alternative form. The first proposal is for an independent right of discovery of
the names and addresses of defense witnesses. This approach is preferred by the Ad-
visory Committee. The second proposal allows government discovery of defense wit-
nesses only after the defense has applied for discovery. For a similar state approach,
see FA. R. CRasm. P. 1.220 (e).
78. See FLA. R. Cias. P. 1.220(e).
79. At least one state court has concluded that the discovery of the identity of an
expert witness, whom the defendant contemplates calling at trial, is not a violation of
the privilege. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879
(1962). See also Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Traynor
Confronts the Dilenma, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 89 (1965).
80. B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASEs 256
(1969).
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tion of the fact that in an analogous situation compulsory disclosure of
a defendant's private information has been condemned as violative of
the fourth amendment right against unauthorized search and seizure.8'
An independent right to discovery on the part of the government,
however, would allow the defendant to exercise his right to discovery
while preserving his right against self-incrimination. The protective
order under proposed Rule 16(d) (1) would afford the motion judge
an opportunity to bar discovery information that is self-incriminatory
in nature.8 2 While the protective order would be available regardless
of whether prosecutorial discovery was independent or reciprocal, an
independent theory would enable the defendant to exercise his right
of discovery without raising the question of relinquishment of the right
against self-incrimination. In any event, one commentator has indi-
cated that the discovery of defense witnesses could escape all questions
of violation of the right, because such discovery would only be antici-
pating a later revelation of the identity of defense witnesses on the trial
of the cause.83 This argument finds support under the new rule, since
the only disclosure of witnesses that the prosecution can seek is the
names of witnesses the defense intends to call.
In summary, then, the independent right of discovery of witnesses
by the prosecution seems to be the preferred approach. Under an
independent discovery theory, infringement of the right against self-
incrimination is much less likely to occur. Discovery by the defense
and discovery by the prosecution, which are consistent with pursuit of
the goal of openness in the ascertainment of fact, proceed from different
frames of reference, are motivated by different interests, and, in so far
as the defense is concerned, must take cognizance of fundamental rights
secured to the accused. Mr. Justice Douglas best summarized the case
for independent discovery when he said:
To deny a defendant the opportunity to discovery-an opportun-
ity not withheld from defendants who agree to prosecutorial dis-
covery or from whom discovery is not sought-merely because the
81. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885). See also dissent of Mr. Justice
Douglas to the 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, H.R.
Doc. No. 390, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1966).
82. Protective orders will be dealt with later. It should be noted, however, that the
issuance of the order under proposed rule 16(d) (1) would be within the discretion of
the court and after the defendant had sustained the burden of a "proper showing." No
showing is required for prosecutorial discovery and there is no apparent discretion in
the court to deny discovery of witnesses by the government under 16(b) (1) (3).
83. B. GEORGE, supra note 80, at 256.
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defendant chooses to exercise the constitutional right to refrain
from self-incrimination arguably imposes a penalty upon the exer-
cise of that fundamental privilege. s4
Protective Non-Disclosure, Preservation of
Testimony and the Protective Order
The preliminary draft of proposed Rule 16 embodies a threefold
approach toward protection against abuse in the discovery of witnesses'
names and addresses. Two of the enumerated safeguards, protective
nondisclosure and the preservation of testimony, are for the exclusive
use of the government.s5 The third, the protective order, has been
expanded to allow its use by the defense as well as the government. s°
To invoke protective non-disclosure, the attorney for the government
need only certify to the court that discovery of the identity of govern-
ment witnesses may subject the witness or others to "physical or sub-
stantial economic harm or coercion." 87 The court must prevent dis-
covery when the government invokes this provision. This power lodged
in the prosecution is analogous to the widely criticized provisions of the
present rule which subject discovery to the unfettered discretion of the
court. It is true that that prosecution, should it act in bad faith, could
frustrate the purpose of the rule. However, it would be presumptuous
to impute bad faith to a government prosecutor by denying such a right,
especially in consideration of the compelling state interest which he must
protect.
The major argument against a right of discovery of the identity of
government witnesses has been the fear of the defendant who would
abuse the right by suborning perjury and threatening witnesses. s8  This
problem can become particularly acute when the accused is a member
of a ruthless criminal syndicate."9 Uncontrolled witness intimidation
84. Douglas, supra note 81, at 15.
85. Both of these devices are included in 1970 PROPOSED Awm NArtrs, R. 16(a) (1)
(IV), 48 F.R.D. at 589-90.
86. This change is reflected in the substitution of "a party" wherever "the govern-
ment' had heretofore been used. 1970 PRoPosED A.mENDmENTs, R. 16(d) (1), 48 F.R.D.
at 593.
87. Id. 16(a) (1) (VI), 48 F.R.D. at 589-90.
88. See Brennen, supra note 17.
89. Beyond protective non-disclosure another means for protecting against abuse by
the criminal syndicate and its "house counsel" has been proposed by Harris Steinberg.
He feels that the good faith defendant should not suffer by limited discovery because of
abuse of discovery by syndicate lawyers.
If you are talking in terms of an unworthy bar, lets whip the crooks out
of the temple of justice, but lets not use discovery to do it, let's use dis-
barment here. I say to you that lawyers should be treated as lawyers ...
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could subvert the entire system of criminal justic. Further, as one
noted authority has indicated, ". . to explain why you are fearful, is
very likely to disclose the very information that will subject your wit-
ness to danger." 9' For any system of criminal justice to meet its goal
of removing the criminal from society, the free flow to enforcement
officials of information regarding criminal activity must be preserved.
If adequate protection is not given to informers, there is not likely to be
a continuation of their services. 2
If criminal discovery is to be efficacious, it must be predicated upon
an adversary situation wherein both prosecution and defense are sincere
in their efforts to pursue the truth. Absent this intent, there must be
available strong safeguards against abuse. 8
The second weapon in the prosecution's arsenal of safeguards is the
right of the government to move for the preservation of its witnesses'
testimony after the accused has moved for the discovery of their iden-
tities. 4 The Advisory Committee has indicated that this procedure is
an alternative to protective nondisclosure." In order to utilize this
if they do unbecoming things, they should be disciplined, on proof, before
a referee .... I think that a few well directed, well-chosen, vigorously-ad-
ministered disbarment hearings will have a wonderful effect and will relieve
the District Attorney of making these deep psychological insight evaluations
of lawyers before they give discovery.
Remarks by Harris Steinberg in a panel discussion before the Judicial Conference of
the Second Judicial Circuit, Sept. 8, 1967, Discovery In Criminal Cases, in 44 F.R.D. 481,
524 (1967).
90. The Advisory Committee has cited two extreme cases involving witness intimida-
tion; however, it is not the criminal defendant's nature that is critical, rather, whatever
his nature, the criminal defendant is capable of abuse of discovery and any rule must
recognize the potentials for abuse and guard against them. See Bergen Drug Co. v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962); House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
91. Remarks by Jon 0. Newman in a panel discussion before the Judicial Conference
of the Second Judicial Circuit, Sept. 8, 1967, Discovery in Criminal Cases, in 44 F.R.D.
481, 499 (1967).
92. See United States v. Estep, 151 F. Supp. 668, 672-73 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
93. Strong support for protective non-disclosure is given by the ABA STA.NDARDS RE-
LATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRAL § 2.5(b) (1969), which grants this
power of protection in the discretion of the court. Even though the STANDARDS do not
go as far as the Preliminary Proposed Rules, which give the right to the prosecution
without benefit of judicial discretion, the ABA approach is noteworthy because the
STANDARns represent the least discretionary and most liberal approach to criminal dis-
covery to date.
94. The provision for a hearing to preserve the testimony of government witnesses is
contained within Proposed Rule 16(a) (1) (VI) as is the option for protective non-dis-
closure.
95. 1970 PROPOsED AMENDMENTS, 48 F.R.D. at 605.
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safeguard, the prosecution moves the court to preserve the testimony
of any or all witnesses. The testimony is taken at a separate hearing
where the defendant has the right to cross-examine the witness. The
preserved testimony is admissible to prove the prosecution's case in
chief in the event the witness is unavailable at the time of trial, without
government fault, or has changed his testimony.
The clear purpose of this device is to minimize the incidence of sub-
ornation of perjury and intimidation of witnesses. 6 By preservation, it
is thought that there will be no impetus for witness intimidation, be-
cause the testimony will be available no matter what happens to the
witness. However, even though the preserved testimony is available to
the prosecution, testimony in this form will not be as convincing to a
jury as testimony delivered willingly and clearly by the witness at
trial. Also, as this part of Rule 16(a) (1) (VI) is now constructed there
is no protection for the witness. The government ends up with their
admissible testimony, but the witness is left with his identity revealed
to potential detractors, or even assailants. Further, there is nothing to
prevent a bad faith defendant or his confederates from "getting to the
witness" at or just before the preservation hearing thereby inducing
perjured testimony because of fear. 7 This is a most important consid-
eration in light of the Supreme Court decisions which hold that the
defendant and his counsel must have an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine the witness for the government."' It is not likely that the gov-
ernment will make great use of the right to preserve testimony unless
it is clear that the witness will be unavailable for trial through no fault
of his own or unless there is little chance that the accused or his counsel
will engage in intimidation or suborning of perjury. When safeguards
are needed, a prosecutor is most likely to choose the protection most
comprehensive, protective nondisclosure.
If the prosecution should choose to exercise its right to preserve testi-
mony, the courts will be constrained to rule whether the use of the
96. Id.
97. See Remarks of Jon 0. Newman, supra note 91, at 499. Cf. Brennen, supra note
88, at 99-101.
98. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1964). It is obvious that "an opportunity" to cross-examine, when viewed in the con-
text of preserving testimony under Rule 16, will necessitate adequate notice as to time
and place of hearing, the purpose for which the witness is called and, probably, the
identity of the witness in order for the defendant to be able to meet the government's
attack in the same way he would meet it at trial. The interlude between the motion to
preserve and the hearing could afford the bad faith defendant or his confederates with
the opportunity they need to engage in intimidation.
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preserved testimony meets the requirements of the confrontation clause
of the Constitution. Currently, the doctrine that is controlling with
regard to confrontation and pre-trial hearings appears in California v.
Green.9 Read in light of Green, the provision made for the preserva-
tion of testimony in the proposed rules seems to meet every requisite of
the confrontation clause of the Constitution.
The third safeguard accorded by proposed Rule 16 is the provision
for the issuance of protective orders by the court under 16(d) (1).1 °
The significant change from the protective order under present Rule
16 is that the amended version opens up the use of the protective order
to the defense. 1' 1 While it is of little consequence to the defendant in
the area of witness lists, 102 the order can be invaluable where the gov-
ernment has sought discovery of a letter, document or other object that
is self-incriminatory and therefore privileged. It is mentioned here be-
cause it illustrates the emphasis which the Advisory Committee places
upon equality of discovery, not only as to disclosure, but also as to
protection for both litigants. While the order issues in the discretion
of the court after an affirmative showing, a similar procedure has been
countenanced in a recent Supreme Court decision.1 3
99. 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970). In Green a witness's pre-trial hearing testimony was ad-
mitted to contradict his testimony in court. The testimony had been given in the
presence of defendant's counsel who had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at
the hearing. The California Supreme Court reversed Green's conviction because it con-
strued the confrontation clause as not being satisfied by either cross-examination at the
preliminary hearing or at the trial relative to prior testimony. People v. Green, 70 Cal.2d
654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1968). Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority,
reversed the California Supreme Court observing that the witness, Porter, was
... [ulnder oath; respondent was represented by counsel . . . respondent
had every opportunity to cross-examine Porter as to his statement; and the
proceedings were conducted before a judicial tribunal, equipped to provide
a judicial record of the hearings. Under these circumstances, Porter's state-
ment would, we think, have been admissible at trial even in Porter's absence
if Porter had been actually unavailable, despite good-faith efforts of the State
to produce him .... [Wie do not think a different result should follow
where the witness is actually produced.
90 S. Ct. at 1938-39.
100. See 1970 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, 48 F.R.D. at 593, 610.
101. See AMENDMENTS To RULEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE, 39 F.R.D. 69, 175, 178 (1966)
(Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 16).
102. It goes without saying, that the efficacy of the system of criminal justice in
general, and discovery in particular, is dependent upon the uncompromising integrity
of the government. Therefore, the system would fail completely if a safeguard were
needed against government intimidation of witnesses or suborning of perjury.
103. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 n. 14 (1969).
DISCOVERY
Continuing Duty to Disclose
The Advisory Committee has wisely included in proposed Rule 16 a
section dealing with the continuing duty to disclose the names of addi-
tional witnesses and evidence that has come to light.04 When the new
witness or information become available, the party against whom dis-
covery has been utilized then notifies the other party, his attorney, or
the court of the existence of such additional evidence or witness. The
burden then shifts to the court to modify its previous order, or to the
other party to move for additional discovery. The approach is sound,
because it requires affirmative acts in the interest of discovery from all
parties concerned, including the court which presumably would act
without further application if justice required.
Failure to Comply and Failure to Call
One of the greatest shortcomings of similar state procedures for dis-
covery of witnesses is the lack of sanctions for failure to comply. This
shortcoming appears in a majority of the states discussed. The unfor-
tunate result is that the question of sanction is left entirely in the court's
hands. The court must decide whether to penalize the non-complying
party, and if so, what action to take, without the benefit of any statu-
tory guidance. Here, the Advisory Committee has wisely left the
sanctions for noncompliance to the discretion of the court105 The dis-
cretion, however, is not unfettered. Rather, it is a discretion to act in
accordance with the circumstances that resulted in nondisclosure. 00
Proposed Rule 16 allows no comment at the trial regarding the failure
to call a witness whom a party has indicated he expects to call. 0 7 The
policy is clear that neither side should be required to use every detail
of the case which he has planned. Both sides must be left free to meet
exigencies not anticipated when the trial began. Thus, to force the
calling of all listed witnesses would inhibit the ability to make use of
tactical advantage as it arises. Likewise, to comment upon the failure
to call the witness could prejudice the case because such comment has
104. See 1970 PRorosED A11mNl:mENrs, R. 16(c), 48 F.R.D. at 592.
105. See Id. 16(d) (3), 48 F.R.D. at 593.
106. For a clear understanding of the reasoning behind the inclusion of such broad
discretion for this area of enforcement in a rule that makes a patent effort to define and
limit discretion, see A mNnmrrs To RuLEs oF CimrurNAL PaocrDmua, 39 F.RD. 69, 178
(1966) (Advisory Committee Note to Rule 16).
107. See 1970 PROPOSED AiEsvmN rals, R. 16(a) (4), 16(b) (3), 48 F.R.D. at 590-91, 592,
with regard to witnesses the defense has listed and failed to call.
1971]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the potential of raising an inference in the factfinder's mind that the
witness, and therefore the litigant, is unreliable. Finally, the provision
barring comment on the failure to call achieves the purpose of the rule
in granting a liberal measure of discovery for fact ascertainment in
preparation for the trial. The disposition of the case, however, is left
to the evidence produced at trial.
CONCLUSION
This note has dealt with only one area that is part of the overall
concern of criminal discovery, and the myriad rules and applications
made by the various states to secure to defendants at least nominal dis-
covery of the all important witness list.
One commentator has remarked, "The dilemma of criminal discovery
is real and viable solutions to its many complex problems are not easily
drafted." 108 And so it must be asked if the discovery of witnesses under
the proposed amended rules presents a viable solution to the confusion
of the states. Do 16(a) (1) (VI), 16(b) (1) (III), and the other subsec-
tions create a rule susceptible of uniform application in the interest of
pre-trial fact ascertainment regardless of who is seeking the discovery?
These questions, of course, will remain conjectural until the rule is
adopted and the courts are given an opportunity to construe itY°9 In
any event, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, in drafting proposed amended
Rule 16, and in particular the sections concerning the discovery of
witnesses, has met the complex problems of discovery and affirmatively
drafted a rule designed to alleviate the problem. More drafting will be
needed before broad and liberal discovery is realized in criminal proce-
dure. The trend, however, appears clear, and the disclosure of prose-
cution and defense witnesses, upon adoption of proposed amended Rule
16, will stand as one of the important achievements along the way.
ROBERT R. KAPLAN
108. Comment, Toward Effective Criminal Discovery: A Proposed Revision of Fed-
eral Rule 16, 15 VuL. L. REv. 655, 689 (1970).
109. Remarks by B. Kostelanetz in a panel discussion before the Judicial Conference
of the Second Judicial Circuit, Sept. 8, 1967, Discovery in Criminal Cases, in 44 F.R.D.
481, 490-91 (1967). Speaking of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Mr. Koste-
lanetz said that ". . . the rules . . . are . . . what the motion judges-and more par-
ticularly the motion judge hearing your case says they are."
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